I will likely return to these papers later, but I wanted to briefly comment
on the interesting research on the recession and the impact of household debt -
by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi. Here are two of their recent papers:
Mike Konczal at
Rortybomb interviewed Amir Sufi on the topic of balance sheet recessions
and posted the
transcript on his blog. The entire interview is worth reading, but I'm going
to include a few excerpts on Sufi's view of the recession and its causes.
Regarding the question of which policy is likely to be more effective in
addressing the aggregate demand and unemployment problem, i.e., fiscal stimulus or
household debt reduction (e.g., via principal forgiveness or credit writedowns), Sufi says:
I think that right-leaning economists don’t deny that the zero lower
bound could be a friction. I think the zero-lower bound does bother them,
that they think it is a fundamental friction. I think where they’d
disagree with Paul [Krugman], and to an extent even I disagree with Paul, is that if
you look at his model, the optimal policy in those models isn’t necessarily
fiscal stimulus, it is writing down the debts of borrowers. That’s the
number one policy that fixes the problem.
[...]
I come from a finance micro background, so if I were to criticize the
zero-lower bound literature, which I use, it is that fiscal stimulus doesn’t
fall so naturally out of it. Paul goes to lengths to argue against the
argument “how can more debt solve a debt problem?” and explains it is
because the borrowers are constrained, and there’s some truth to that.
But the fundamental problem in these models, what generates the zero-lower
bound problem, is a sharp reduction in consumption by borrowers. Why not
attack that problem head on? If you look at Rogoff’s opinion against
Krugman’s, I think this is the main difference. They agree on the zero-lower
bound nature of the problem, but have different tactics on how to fight it.
I tend to agree with the view that directly targeting the household debt
problem seems to make more sense than fiscal stimulus.
Here are a
couple of
links to Paul Krugman's views on this.
On the issue of whether the debt and demand problem is just related to regions
that suffered a housing crash, Sufi says:
You are correct: if you unconditionally look at the high debt-to-income
places, a lot of it is highly correlated with places that had construction
booms and a lot of migration. To get rid of the construction and migration
effects, we try to use exogenous variation in debt-to-income ratios that is
driven by housing supply elasticity. This is a technique called “two-stage
least squares.” We regress the debt-income ratio on how hard it is to build
in an area. The idea is that this instrument allows us to disentangle the
effect of debt levels from construction and migration. The results after
doing this are very strong. Any place that had a high debt-income ratio,
whether or not it had a construction boom, is suffering massively now.
On the question of whether the "wealth effect"
does or
does not explain the recession, as opposed to the notion of a "balance sheet
recession", Konczal and Sufi had this exchange:
[Konczal] : Another response to this model is that the debt-to-income
ratios don’t actually matter that much. What is really driving this is a
wealth effect. People feel poorer from losing housing value, and thus they
spend less. James Surowiecki just had a piece arguing against these
balance sheet recession models in The New Yorker, “The
Deleveraging Myth.” Dean Baker from CEPR makes this argument as well.
[Sufi]: Well obviously I disagree 100 percent with that for both
theoretical and empirical reasons. The theoretical reason is that
housing should not be thought of in a pure wealth sense. We all have to
consume housing going forward. And the value of my house going down is also
the same value of the price of housing going down. The easiest way to
imagine this is to picture a young couple that currently rents and will buy
a house in the future. If housing prices decline, it is good for them
because they can then more easily buy a house in the future. Clearly, this
is not a negative wealth effect for the young couple.
[Konczal]: But as far as I understand it there are studies that find a
wealth effect in housing.
[Sufi]: This is a semantic point on what you call it. I’m saying as an
economist that if you call something a wealth effect, then it has nothing to
do with borrowing constraints and debt levels, and that effect in theory
should be zero. To the degree that we observe that when people’s house
prices go up they consume more, that’s not a wealth effect — that’s a
borrowing constraint being alleviated, and people borrowing against
collateral that they couldn’t before. Which is a very different thing, and
it matters empirically. My own research on this topic shows definitively
that people consume aggressively out of housing wealth because of borrowing
constraints, not a simple wealth effect.
Here’s why I fundamentally disagree with the “wealth effect” argument.
Suppose you have an economy that looks like the U.S. before the recession,
where you have an extremely skewed net wealth distribution. The wealth
effect argument is that the response of the economy to house price declines
would have been the same if you flattened that out versus if you had the
polarization that we have now. And I disagree with that fundamentally, and
that’s what the research shows. The net wealth distribution matters.
People who have very high debt-to-income ratios cut their spending very
dramatically, and there is no way a pure wealth effect can explain the
magnitude of the cut.
Also, on the topic of the wealth distribution and its impact:
The distribution of net wealth matters a lot. Let’s suppose there’s
$100 of wealth in the economy and there’s a hundred people. If everybody had
$1 of wealth, and then there’s a massive drop in house prices, my argument
is that this recession wouldn’t have been nearly as severe. It’s because the
five guys at the top have all of the $100 and are just lending to the other
95, that’s why the recession is so severe when house prices collapse.
Paul said this a few times on his blog, and he’s usually very clear, but I
don’t think he’s been clear enough on explaining this. These models on
why deleveraging matters are all about the net wealth distribution. We
shouldn’t be surprised that this recession and the Great Depression were
preceded by very large increases in wealth inequality. This is well
documented during the 1920s and the 2000s. This is why I get a bit annoyed
at the guys who are saying it’s just a pure wealth effect, because it’s
something bigger than that.
Do read the
entire interview - it's worth it. Sufi also talks about savings rates and
other factors.